The focuses of the paper
In the analyses of the texts, we first focused on how the text mentioned International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). ICRP is an advisory body providing recommendations and guidance on radiation protection and strategies. While the recommendations from ICRP become the basis for the Radiation Hazard Prevention Act in various countries including Japan, there is a controversy regarding the risks of radiation, particularly, that of low-dose radiation exposure (Koide, 2011a; Nakagawa, 2011) . Therefore, the information on ICRP and the nature of its recommendation should play a critical role in considering the quality of science communication as a guide for citizens to make various choices. As discussed in more detailed manner later however, either the explanatory descriptions for ICRP are not enough, or it suffers a problem of credibility manipulation.
The paper focused on this point and examined the concrete descriptions on this issue. The examination was guided by social psychological models of persuasion, which have empirically examined the effect of credibility manipulation on attitude changes induced by persuasive messages.
Second, we focused on the power relationship between society (i.e., citizens) and science (i.e., scientists) that was implicitly assumed in science communications. This focus was guided by the idea that science has to answer the needs of citizens and the society, and science communication is an important route for science to relate with citizens (Fujigaki, 2008) . Therefore, the nature of the relationship that the communication implicitly assumes, especially the power relationship, must be examined carefully to evaluate the quality of science communication. Examination of the assumed power is also important in regard to its relations to the perception of expertness of scientists. According to French & Raven (1959) , expertness is one of the five power basis, which enables the person who possess knowledge or expertise to influence the attitudes and behavior of others. If the expertness of the scientists is emphasized in the communication, it will create the unequal power relationship between scientists and citizens, and the communication may have the authority to influence the attitude and behavior of citizens to the undesirable degree. Therefore, the analysis of communication should be made in terms of scientists' attempt to manipulate the power relationship by emphasizing their expertness. Such attempt would be evaluated as problematic if it leads to paternalism and deprivation of citizens' willingness to exert a control over their own life matters (Fujigaki, 2008; Todayama, 2011) . Guided by these considerations, we analyzed the power relationship between the scientists and the citizens that was implied by the texts.
Academic disagreements in the risk of low-dose radiation and evaluation of ICRP
There is a controversy regarding the risks of low-dose radiation exposure. That is, some scientists advocate the serious risk of low-dose radiation while others consider that the risk has not been proved scientifically (Saito, 2011; Koide, 2011a) . However, as Todayama & Karasawa (2013) It uses convenient calculations to explain radiation exposure and allow the release of radiation into the environment." (p.38).
In the "points" column, which summarizes the content of the individual sections, the following sentence is included: "Relying on ICRP standards is dangerous. There is no such thing as being too careful when it comes to internal exposure." (p.38).
Another unique feature of Takarajima Henshūbu (2011) Second, ECRR criticizes that ICRP's model does not consider the characteristics of a "sievert." As a unit of measurement, a sievert represents the total energy absorbed by organs or tissues, which is divided by the total mass of those organs or tissues and then averaged. As such, when radioactive molecules are absorbed (a typical example is when particles of plutonium are inhaled into the lungs), they emit a concentrated burst of alpha rays which focus on a small area of the body. This "hot particle" The risks of low-dose radiation have not necessarily been scientifically determined. However, provisional "scientifically appropriate" standards must be established to guide governmental policies and citizens' decision making for their own behavior.
People expect the scientists to give some sort of standards as a matter of urgency. As a result, scientists are forced to make a commitment despite the existence of uncertainty. Furthermore, the commitment is inevitably influenced by the decisions regarding how scientific research should proceed as well as the political and social stances to undertake. This creates a situation in which citizens should take into consideration "who" formulated the standards and his or her social and political stance when evaluating the appropriateness of adopting the standards as the rule to regulate the society. At the root of government standards is the need to provide citizens with materials on which they may base their decisions. Then, it would be desirable to provide both a "standardized explanation" (in the above sense)
as well as anti-standardized explanation. Of course, it should include the information concerning each explanation's foundation, the counterarguments, the characteristics and the standpoints of the advocators of each explanation, and the history of the debate between them.
The credibility war and its problems
Takarajima Henshūbu (2011) should be esteemed for providing counterarguments from the ECRR, but it is unfortunate that these are only used to suggest that the "nuclear industry- Still, the strategy to omit the explanation on the scientific debates on the effect of low-dose radiation, or the strategy to focus on the credibility of ICRP rather than the content of the scientific debate, seems to cause some problems to hinder the judg- self (Hovland & Weiss, 1951; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) . This is particularly the case for those who are less motivated to invest cognitive resources to process the messages and those who lack the basic knowledge to understand the content of the messages.
These characteristics actually fit to those of "general public."
That is, the audience of these books seems to be the classes who are vulnerable by the strategies of credibility manipulation.
Second, the simplistic presentation of the debates may lead to the confirmation bias. The confirmation bias refers to our tendency to make inferences and judgments in the direction to be consistent with existing knowledge, expectations, beliefs, and wishes (Klayman & Ha, 1987) . When the information concerning the debate is missing, the audience would "fill in" the views and ideas that are consistent with what they know or believe. Of course, the "filled in" information is often arbitrary and scientifically inaccurate, and consequently, the audience would construct scientifically invalid representation of radiation's impact.
Therefore, it seems to give us a lesson for an essential condition of science communication; it is important to offer scientific foundations and evaluations for each explanation when experts differ in their opinions. Then, directions on how non-experts should judge and act must follow to them, if they are to be made, when communicating risks in situations with uncertainty.
Persuasive rhetoric
Both ICRP and ECRR believe that there is no threshold for lowdose radiation risks. In reality, no matter how low the radiation dose, some degree of exposure cannot be avoided after the Fukushima disaster regardless of location. Even if we live in somewhere far away from Fukushima, there is a chance to consume the food contaminated by radiation. Therefore, once we have determined that there is a risk, we must decide on a strategy to avoid its impact.
In determining the strategy, we have to consider that the risk is not limited to the health risk which is directly associated with the radiation exposure. The risks would include unemployment, the loss of income and pride due to the predicament of being forced to evacuate one's home, the costs of avoiding "contaminated" food and water, and the interpersonal conflict among family or community members due to the difference in their opinion how to cope with the threat of radiation exposure.
The actions to avoid the exposure inevitably lead to (sometimes drastic) changes of our life style, and the risks associated with such changes are wide-ranged and serious. Indeed, various health problems, such as influenza, peptic ulcers, and brain structure changes, associated with the psychological distress after the Great East Japan Earthquake are reported (e.g., Kanno et al., 2012; Tohma et al., 2012) . Therefore, as Mizuno et al. (2011) says, "it is necessary to have a clear understanding of the risks of radiation, the affiliated risks it presents, and the effort required to avoid radiation when deciding how to respond," (p.113)
or that "unnecessary exposure should be rationally avoided as much as possible." (p.148).
The issue is whether this "rationality" cannot be reduced to tal. It appears to be mired in negative opinions based on simplistic impressions that "radioactivity = scary" and "radioactivity = environmental pollution." There seem to be a lack of concrete or real debates on the safety of the facilities themselves or the radioactive materials that they emit." (Ōtsuki, 2008, p.15) .
These statements are typical examples of the communication
in the "deficit model," in which non-experts' fear and opposition are seen as nothing more than an emotional reaction created from the lack of scientific knowledge (Dickson, 2005 we should note that the strategy of persuasive rhetoric has some problems as a "persuasion strategy." First, this strategy is not very effective to those who are motivated to think seriously about the issue (Petty & Casioppo, 1986) . The general recommendation from the findings in persuasion studies is that these audiences are more likely to react to o the quality of the persuasive message. Therefore, the message without the data or some form of evidence will be evaluated in a negative manner.
Second and more serious problem is that the strategy is likely to evoke the psychological reactance among the audience.
Psychological reactance is a motivationally aroused state that occurs when one perceives the threat to behavioral freedoms (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981) . We generally believe (and want to believe) that we have freedom to select what, when, and how to conduct our behavior, and are motivated to protect the freedom of choice. Therefore, when we are exposed to an authoritative persuasion which directs us how to behave, we feel the fear for loss of further freedom, and try to re-establish the threatened freedom. One way to re-establish the freedom is to reject the message, or adopt the attitude which is opposite to the persuasion (Worchel & Brehm, 1970; Ringold, 2002) . In addition, the reactance is often accompanied with hostility, aggressive feeling, and derogation toward the sender of the message who limits the freedom (Kohn & Barnes, 1977) . Therefore, an attempt of persuasion with persuasive rhetoric is likely to fail if it evokes the reactance.
Despite these problems, the persuasive rhetoric has been used regardless of whether the communicator is pro-or antinuclear power. The style of communication that proclaims "If you just listen to me, you are sure to become anti-nuclear power" can also be placed into the category of persuasive rhetoric. Unfortunately, some best-selling books advocating anti-nuclear power are not completely free of this rhetoric. For instance, see the readers' review on Amazon.com for Koide (2011a; 2011b).
(2) About one year after the publication, more than 100 reader reviews posted, and one of them stated, "However, the sources are not provided, so it is impossible to distinguish between what is simply the author's opinion and what is a scientifically proven fact. After reading it, I was left feeling confused". (3) It is important to note that this review was posted by a member of the general public. He or she recognized the most serious problem of nuclear power is the highly radioactive waste it produces, approved of the arguments in the book, but indicated that the lack of sources was a shortcoming. On one hand, it may show the maturity of the general public as the recipients of science communication. However, we also have to note that this might be the rare case. The persuasive rhetoric seems to have a certain effect for the general public to naturally accept the arguments. Considering the problems stated above, the persuasive rhetoric may have succeeded to the extent that the general audience is the passive recipient of the message, and considered the choice should be made under the guidance of authorities, not by themselves.
A new direction
Nevertheless, we can see a small but important change in scientific communication regarding nuclear power and radiation after the Great East Japan Earthquake. Undoubtedly, the incident brought about a diminishment in the authority of nuclear power experts. In addition, the question of how to protect ourselves from radioactive contamination must now be faced without reference to being either pro-or anti-nuclear power. Due to this factor, the power of persuasive rhetoric, at least in regard to radiation risks, is diminishing. Being comforted or frightened is irrelevant to the responses necessary to deal with the actual radiation. A phrase that succinctly sums up this change is to "know how to be frightened" Nakagawa (2011) is particularly noteworthy in this respect;
it presents the general point of ICRP recommendations and various standards, and explains the logics behind them. Then the text concludes as "we must take into consideration both the various risks and the psychological burden that are attendant upon safety regulations and the risks of exposure, and choose the 'less objectionable' option." (p.130). The following sentence is a crucial one: "Those who will actually bear the risks should be the main voice in the debate, and the strategies to cope with the risks should be flexible so that they accommodate the needs posed by the actual conditions." (p.130). This sentence argues that the main body who should weigh the risks and "decide how to respond based on a clear understanding" are neither government officials nor scientists but those who would actually bear the risks. In other words, "unnecessary exposure which should be rationally avoided as much as possible" is not only determined by scientific rationality but also by social rationality.
From this viewpoint, Nakagawa (2011) suggests the following:
(1) Since a coping strategy based on a presupposed average level of exposure is not appropriate, personal dosimeters that will enable detailed responses tailored to individual levels of exposure should be distributed to residents (pp.136-137).
(2) Justification of protection plans (showing that the amount of inconvenience caused was justified) is as important as the optimization of protection plans (balancing the detriments caused by the exposure with the economic and social detriments caused by the plan) (p.137).
(3) The decision-making process should be transparent and the data that led to the adopted protection plan should be made available so that third parties can review them (p.138).
(4) The drafting process of radiation protection plans should be designed such that residents themselves may play an active role in the process (p.142).
The author indeed practiced the third suggestion in its writing. That is, Nakagawa (2011) cites academic papers and "ICRP Publication 111" on radiation protection in an emergency situation. It also indicates the source of the latter.
To summarize these proposals, Nakagawa (2011) advocates the need to escape from the paternalism in building the radiation protection plans. In regard to this point alone, Nakagawa (2011) and Koide (2011b) are in broad agreement. In a discussion of food standards, Koide (2011b) states, "It is certainly not the case that things are safe simply because they fall below a standard threshold," and "Why not mark each food product with its level of pollution so that consumers can see them? If the level of pollution on a food product is properly displayed, then people could make their own decisions about whether to consume the product. The current situation enables others to make the decisions about standards that impact our own lives, which is fundamentally wrong. What is important is that we have to decide by ourselves whether to allow ourselves to be exposed to radiation." (p.95). This argument on personal responsibility is extended to citizens who previously allowed the use of nuclear power until something actually went wrong: "You may all think I didn't know anything about nuclear power … The government and the power companies who said it was safe are the ones to blame ... I am not responsible … But those who are deceived share a certain amount of responsibility for their own deception" (p. 94).
Persuasive rhetoric is one form of paternalism that occurs in communication. As long as non-experts continue to follow those they identified as authorities, paternalism will continue.
Continuing this attitude leads to "I can't tell which is which… i.e., not knowing who is trustworthy." However, in the post-3.11 world in which we are forced to live with radioactive contamination (whether we like it or not), it is necessary to switch from scientific communication that "persuades" us to believe the putative future safety or danger, to scientific communication that aids the citizen-based decision-making process in regard to actual radiation protection. As we have seen, the first tentative step toward making this switch has already occurred, and the maturity of citizens to accept the responsibility for "making their own decision" is needed.
Notes
(1) Both Tomonaga (2011) and Mizuno et al. (2011) refer to panic. However the two texts presented contrastive views for the cause and the result of panic. The former concluded that the Three Mile Island incident itself actually caused the panic (p.19) but the latter stated that the government did not release the needed information of the accidents immediately for the fear of panic and this had the opposite result of setting off panic and the increase of the damage (p.108).
(2) We do not argue that Koide's writings always adopt the persuasive rhetoric, while we consider that the example mentioned in the text is worth noting since the problem of the persuasive rhetoric was pointed out by a public reviewer. (3) "We cannot tell whether this book is fiction or non-fiction"
by Ponta, 2011/7/15.
